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CARSTEN THOMAS EBENROTH*
LOUISE ELLEN TEITZt

Winning (Or Losing) By Default:
The Act of State Doctrine,
Sovereign Immunity and Comity In
International Business Transactions
In the summer of 1983, two federal district judges in the Southern District
of New York rendered contradictory decisions. Each considered the default
by Costa Rican public sector banks on syndicated loans due to the imposition of currency controls restricting external debt payment in conjunction

with rescheduling of all sovereign debt. The Costa Rican banks asserted the
act of state doctrine as a defense to enforcement and as grounds for dismissal
in both cases. In one case, Libra Bank Limited v. Banco Nacionalde Costa
Rica,1 the judge ordered payment; in the other case, Allied Bank International v. Banco CreditoAgricola de Cartago,2 the judge dismissed the claim,
finding that the act of state doctrine barred inquiry into the acts of the Costa

Rican government. No appeal was taken in Libra, with all parties subse*Professor of International Economic Law at the University of Constance in the Federal
Republic of Germany. He is also counsellor at law in the law firm of Whitman & Ransom, New
York, and previously served as Senior Consultant to the Center on Transnational Corporations
and other UN bodies.
tAssociate, Thompson & Knight, Dallas, Texas. During 1984, Ms. Teitz was a member of
the law faculty at the University of Constance in the Federal Republic of Germany.
1. 570 F. Supp. 870 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
2. 566 F. Supp. 1440 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), affd., 733 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1984), reh'ggranted,July
3, 1984. A consideration of the district court opinions in both Allied and Libra appeared in
InternationalFinancialLaw Review and included a discussion of Frankel v. Banco Nacional de
Mexico, No. 82 Civ. 6457 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 1983) and Weston Banking Corp. v. Turkiye
Garanti Bankasi, 57 N.Y.2d 315, 456 N.Y.S.2d 684, 442 N.E.2d 1195 (1982). Lindskog, Act of
State or Act of Desperation, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Dec. 1983, at 4. The article did not discuss the
Bretton Woods argument raised by Banco Nacional in its motion for reargument in Libra and
issued as a later portion of the district court opinion. See also Brown, Enforcing Sovereign
Lending, INT'L FIN. L. REV., July 1984, at 5 (discussing Second Circuit opinion).
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quently joining in a rescheduling. Allied was appealed to the Second Circuit
which nine months later affirmed the dismissal but in the process created a
3
new stumbling block to litigation involving sovereign debt, "comity."

Specifically disclaiming reliance on the act of state doctrine, the Second
3. A petition for rehearing was filed by Allied Bank International, supported by the United
States as amicus curiae. The Second Circuit granted rehearing on July 3, 1984. Amicus curiae
briefs were submitted by the United States government, the New York Clearing House
Association, and the Rule of Law Committee and the National Foreign Trade Council, Inc. The
first two of these participated as arnicus curiae in oral argument held on October 17, 1984.
The government's position has been that giving effect to the Costa Rican decrees is not
supported by the policy of the United States nor required by international comity. The
government described its interest as follows:
The United States has a strong interest in the decision in this case, which involves the legal
framework applicable to the payment of billions of dollars of loans contracted by foreign
governments and foreign private parties for which New York is the place of payment under
the contract. The Court's opinion was apparently based upon an incorrect view that the
application of Costa Rican law to prevent enforcement of appellant's contract, where Costa
Rican law would otherwise not be applicable, was consistent with United States policies and
was required by comity.
The United States has a substantial interest in this Court's interpretation of United States
policy with respect to the manner in which Costa Rica and other countries deal with their
external financing problems. The United States is particularly concerned that the new
judicial framework adopted by the Court, extending the principles applicable to corporate
bankruptcy proceedings to the balance of payments problems of sovereign states, could
seriously undermine the effectiveness of the current framework for dealing with those
problems. . . .Judicial application of the Costa Rican decrees in United States courts is
inconsistent with achieving these important United States objectives in maintaining an
effective international financial system.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 2-3, Allied Bank International v. Banco
Credito Agricola de Cartago, 733 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1984), reh'ggrantedJuly 3, 1984 [ hereinafter
referred to as Government Brief]. The government argued that the according of comity altered
expectations "in a way that renders contractual relations less certain, thereby discouraging
needed further lending." Government Brief at 7. The government favored a voluntary process
of balancing the interests of creditors and debtors, in connection with an IMF-approved
adjustment process, which process "is impaired, not aided, by judicial recognition of a country's unilateral suspension of external payments on debts expressly made payable in the United
States." Government Brief at 11-12. Substantial emphasis was placed on the adverse impact of
the Second Circuit's opinion on international lending and the creation of uncertainty. In
connection with the act of state doctrine, the government pointed out that its application was
unnecessary since "the only issue is whether the Costa Rican decrees constitute an equitable
defense cognizable in an action in the federal court in New York. Resolution of that issue does
not require the court to sit in judgment of the Costa Rican decrees." Government Brief at
31-32.
The New York Clearing House Association (NYCHA) emphasized the choice of law aspect
of the case, arguing that New York law applied, that the act of state doctrine was a territoriallybased choice of law not applicable here, and that comity "is accorded to foreign law only when
ordinary choice of law rules call for its application and even then only when it is not contrary to
the forum's public policy." Brief of the New York Clearing House Association as Amicus
Curiae at 7-8, Allied Bank International v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 733 F.2d 23 (2d
Cir. 1984), reh'g granted July 3, 1984. The Rule of Law Committee and the National Foreign
Trade Council, Inc. also stressed the need for certainty and enforceability in international
transactions. The Committee argued that the court had expanded and incorrectly applied both
the act of state and comity, the result being "the introduction of grave uncertainty as to the
enforceability of carefully negotiated contract rights in U.S. courts." Brief of Amici Curiae The
Rule of Law Committee and The National Foreign Trade Council, Inc. at 7, Allied Bank
VOL. 19, NO. 1
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Circuit, while citing act of state cases, resurrected the concept of "comity"
within this context from a nineteenth century bankruptcy decision and
found that Cost Rica's rescheduling was consistent with the law and policy of
the United States, as illustrated through U.S. bankruptcy law and foreign
aid. The court also implicitly rejected the reasoning of Libra, that the acts of
the Costa Rican government were a confiscation of property contrary to
U.S. public policy.
International lenders, already plagued by defenses based on sovereign
immunity even after the enactment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976 (FSIA),4 and the act of state doctrine, must now attempt to
anticipate the effects of the newest defense, comity, on foreign sovereigns'
commercial obligations. The overall impact of the Second Circuit's opinion
is to resolder the broken link between the Executive and decisions involving
foreign sovereigns, a connection deliberately dissolved by Congress in 1976
with the enactment of the FSIA. This insures that judicial determinations of
sovereign liability will once again be politically-oriented and leaves international financial transactions shrouded by uncertainty.
I. Act of State Doctrine and the FSIA
A.

BACKGROUND

The act of state doctrine in American jurisprudence has its origins in late
ninetdenth century notions of sovereign immunity. The "classic statement"
of the doctrine is found in Underhill v. Hernandez5 a case in which a
Venezuelan military commander was sued for refusing to grant an American
citizen a passport. In affirming a judgment in favor of the defendant, the
Supreme Court stated:
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other
sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts
of the government of another done within its own territory. Redress of grievances
by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of by
sovereign powers as between themselves. 6
International v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 733 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1984), reh'ggranted
July 3, 1984.
The Costa Rican banks argued that the Second Circuit's opinion is supported by both comity
and the act of state doctrine, pointing to United States involvement in the rescheduling of Costa
Rican debt and U.S. bankruptcy law policies. Fidelity Union Bank is characterized as seeking
to destroy the restructuring and to obtain preferential treatment. "Nothing in this Court's
decision, or the arguments of the Costa Rican Banks, may be read to permit a foreign country
unilaterally to abrogate its debts to U.S. citizens." Brief of Defendants-Appellees on Rehearing at 2, Allied Bank International v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 733 F.2d 23 (2d Cir.
1984), reh'g granted, July 3, 1984.
4. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1602-1611 (West Supp. 1984) (hereinafter cited as FISA].
5. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
6. Id. at 252.
WINTER 1985
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Subsequent Supreme Court cases continued the emphasis on sovereignty
and comity, but also recognized what many scholars have referred to as the
conflict of laws origins of the doctrine; the act of the foreign state is assumed,
therefore, to be valid under that state's law, and7public policy is not available
as a means to avoid applying the foreign law.
The act of state doctrine was reconsidered by the Supreme Court in Banco
Nacionalde Cuba v. Sabbatino, 8 a Cuban expropriation case, in which the
Court restated the act of state doctrine as one of judicial abstention based on
separation of powers and one of federal common law. In Sabbatino the
Supreme Court refused to review acts of the government of Cuba even
though the acts allegedly violated international law.
[W]e decide only that the Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking
of property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign government, extant and
recognized by this country at the time of suit, in the absence of a treaty or other
unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal principles, even9 if the com-

plaint alleges that the taking violates customary international law.
Justice White, the lone dissenter, criticized the Court's application of the
doctrine to cases including violations of international law.
The Sabbatino opinion was met with severe criticism, and within a few
months, the Hickenlooper Amendment, " ' a Congressional enactment de7. "The modern cases that have come before the courts in the United States involving the act
of state doctrine may all be viewed as conflict of laws cases, involving title to property in
(or the effects of agreements made in) a foreign state. Under traditional doctrines of
conflict of laws, the normal rule looking to application of the law of another state may be
disregarded in certain instances where that law violates the public policy of the forum....
However, though expropriation without adequate compensation, or application of
discriminatory measures such as exchange controls, might be against the public policy of
the forum state, the act of state doctrine precludes the use of that public policy as a basis
for departing from the normal conflict of laws rule. The limitation of the act of state
doctrine to acts affecting property within the acting state ... is consistent with the general
deference to territoriality in conflict of laws doctrine."
Restatement (Revised) of Foreign Relations Law § 428 comment e (Ten. Draft No. 4, 1983).
8. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
9. Id. at 428 (emphasis added)
10. Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-633, § 301(d)(4), 78 Stat. 1009 (1964)
(current version at 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1979)) (amending the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961). The Hickenlooper Amendment provides:
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court in the United States shall decline on
the ground of the federal act of state doctrine to make a determination on the merits giving
effect to the principles of international law in a case in which a claim of title or other right to
property is asserted by any party including a foreign state (or a party claiming through such
state) based upon (or traced through) a confiscation or other taking after January 1, 1959, by
an act of that state in violation of the principles of international law, including the principles
of compensation and the other standards set out in this subsection: Provided, That this
subparagraph shall not be applicable (1) in any case in which an act of a foreign state is not
contrary to international law or with respect to a claim of title or other right to property
acquired pursuant to an irrevocable letter of credit of not more than 180 days duration issued
in good faith prior to the time of the confiscation or other taking, or (2) in any case with
respect to which the President determines that application of the act of state doctrine is
VOL. 19, NO. 1
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signed to reverse a portion of the Sabbatinoopinion by prohibiting a court
from refusing to reach the merits in expropriation cases which involve a
violation of international law. The Supreme Court made two subsequent
attempts after Sabbatinoto clarify the act of state doctrine, once considering
the "Bernstein exception" when the executive branch has affirmatively
expressed its position, 1 and once focusing on the possible existence of an
exception to the act of state doctrine when the sovereign is engaging in
commercial activity. 12 Both times, the Court produced four opinions-the
Bernstein exception was approved by three Justices and the commercial
exception was approved by four Justices. 13
B.

PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF DOCTRINE LACKING

The lack of clear purpose or scope to the act of state doctrine reflects the
multiple uses and theories upon which the doctrine is based.' 4 Judicial
opinions illustrate the strong connection between the act of state and the
political question doctrines, often blurring the distinction, as seen in a recent
Ninth Circuit case, Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. ,'5 which
specifically refers to the act of state doctrine as the "foreign counterpart to
the political question." "Both doctrines require courts to defer to the
branches are
executive or legislative branches of government when those
'
better equipped to handle a politically sensitive issue. 16

required in that particular case by the foreign policy interests of the United States and a
suggestion to this effect is filed on his behalf in that case with the court.
The Hickenlooper Amendment as enacted was subsequently amended in 1965 by the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-171, 79 Stat. 653 (1965). The modifications made the
amendment permanent and clarified the cases to which it applied by adding the words "to
property" after "claim of title or other right."
11. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
12. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
13. The plurality opinion recognizing the Bernstein exception was written by Justice Rehnquist, who was joined by Chief Justice Berger and Justice White. The other six Justices
criticized the exception. In Dunhill, Justice White wrote an opinion in which the Chief Justice,
Justice Powell, and Justice Rehnquist joined. Justice Stevens joined in only a portion of the
opinion, that finding that the act involved was not an exercise of sovereignty, but not in the
portion of the opinion which stated that even if the act was an act of the Cuban government, the
act of state doctrine "should not be extended to include repudiation of a purely commercial
obligation owed by a foreign sovereign or by one of its instrumentalities." Id. at 695. Justices
Powell and Stevens wrote separate concurring opinions. Justice Marshall wrote a dissent in
which Justices Brennan, Stewart and Blackmun joined.
14. For a thorough examination of cases utilizing the act of state doctrine and related
concepts, see Dellapenna, Suing Foreign Governments and Their Corporations:Choice of Law
(Parts III-VI), 86 COM. L.J. 438,442-46 (1981), 86 COM. L.J. 486 (1981), 87 COM. L.J. 8 (1982),
87 COM. L.J. 129 (1982).
15. 705 F.2d 1030, cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 156 (1983).
16. Id. at 1046.
WINTER 1985
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1. FSIA Obfuscation
The passage of the FSIA in 1976 further obfuscated the already muddled
usage of the act of state doctrine by providing a commercial activity exception for jurisdiction. The FSIA, designed to codify the restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity which had been in effect to some extent since 1952,
adopts the general rule that a foreign state is immune unless certain exceptions set forth in the Act apply. Congress, in enacting the FSIA, intended to
eliminate the State Department's influence on the scope of foreign
sovereign immunity and to create general standards to be applied in actions
involving sovereigns. Under the FSIA an exception exists when a sovereign
has waived immunity or when the action is based upon the sovereign's
commercial activity.' 7 At the time that the FSIA was enacted, there was
some discussion about the relation of the Act, especially the commercial act
exception forming the basis for jurisdiction over a sovereign, to the act of
state doctrine, in particular the commercial exception recognized by four
of the Justices in Dunhill. From a jurisdictional viewpoint, under the FSIA
the major difficulty is one of interpreting what is the commercial activity at
issue-how broadly this term should be applied and whether the commercial
activity that provides an exemption from immunity is necessarily the same as
that which may form the act of state. When the focus to determine if a
commercial activity is involved is on the overall transaction, the nature of
the transaction from which the claim arose, jurisdiction may well exist. The
act of state doctrine will provide a valid defense only by narrowing this
construction for the subsequent act of state inquiry.
2. Recent Mexican Currency Control Cases
The inconsistency in application of the act of state doctrine and the
exceptions to immunity under the FSIA, and the resulting distortion of both
doctrines is evident if one examines approaches taken in two recent cases
17. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605 (West Supp. 1984). For a discussion of the FSIA, see generally J.
Stevenson, J. Browne & L. Damrosch, UNITED STATES LAW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY (1983).

18. See H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 19-21, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 6604, 6617-19.

19. No. 82 Civ. 6457 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 1983). The same issue arose in Braka v. Multibanco
Comermex, S.A., 589 F. Supp. 802 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) in which the district judge determined that
while the bank's activities were commercial, the cause of action arose from the bank's conduct
as required by "the Mexican government's act-of-state in the sovereign regulation of Mexican
currency. That cause of action is non-justiciable under the act-of-state doctrine." Braka, 589 F.
Supp. at 804 (footnote omitted). The court also rejected the argument that the Hickenlooper
Amendment was applicable, stating that "[it is clear, however, without a discourse on the
subtle differences between a regulation and a 'taking', that the Mexican government's actions
giving rise to this action were regulatory in nature and not in violation of international law." Id.
at n. 1. The court also considered a claim based on violation of securities laws, finding it within
the commercial exception to the FSIA, but barred by the statute of limitations. See also Braka
et al. v. Bancomer, S.A., No. 83-1727 (S.D.N.Y., June 20, 1984); Braka et al. v. Nacional
Financiera, S.A., No. 83-4161 (S.D.N.Y., July 9, 1984).
VOL. 19, NO. I
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involving Mexican currency controls. In Frankel v. Banco Nacional de
Mexico, S.A. 19 and Callejo v. Bancomer S.A.,2° the plaintiffs sought to

recover on certificates of deposit issued by Mexican banks in early 1982
providing for interest and principal to be paid in United States dollars.
Following the Mexican government's imposition of controls requiring the
withdrawal from all foreign currency accounts maintained in Mexican banks
to be in Mexican pesos and the establishment of fixed exchange rates, the
plaintiffs brought suit. The defendants in both cases filed motions to dismiss
based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1330 was available only when the foreign state is not entitled to
immunity under the FSIA and that the exception to sovereign immunity
under § 1605(a)(2) based on commercial activity was not available. The
district judges in both cases-with the Callejo court relying heavily on, and
quoting extensively from, Frankel-determined that the activity at issue was
the imposition of currency controls which was clearly governmental in
nature, providing immunity under the FSIA. Both courts chose to focus on
the currency controls as the act whose nature must be determined for
purposes of jurisdiction.
These decisions conflict with the Allied opinion. In Allied, the same court
as that involved in Frankel, clearly found that entering into a loan was a
commercial activity for purposes of jurisdiction under the FSIA and thus the
defendant was not immune from jurisdiction. "It is quite clear that the
is based, was a
execution of the promissory notes, upon which this action
2
commercial activity within the meaning of the statute." '
3. Dangerous Expansion and Confusion

The automatic application of the act of state to bar a claim reflects a failure
to distinguish the ground for immunity under the FSIA and the underlying
rational of the act of state doctrine, resulting in a dangerous expansion of the
act of state doctrine. Much of the confusion would seem to stem from the
severance of the act of state doctrine from its sovereign and territorial roots
and the engrafting of separation of powers purposes onto the doctrine. A
jurisdictional analysis should focus on the acts which may or may not create
liability, rather than on the substantive defenses. Both Frankel and Callejo
hark back to the pre-FSIA days of absolute immunity, allowing sovereigns
free reign in activities of a commercial nature, so long as there is a subsequent public action claimed as a defense.
The confusion surrounding the role of the commercial exception to the
FSIA and the commercial exception to the act of state doctrine (the latter, if
20. No. CA-3-82-1604D (N.D. Tex. February 25, 1984), appealpending No. 84-1270 (5th
Cir. 1984) (oral argument granted with tentative date December 1984).
21. Allied, 566 F. Supp. at 1443.
WINTER 1985
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recognized by the courts) merely mirrors the greater problem of the proper
role of sovereign immunity as now codified under the FSIA and its interaction with the judicially-created and now justiciability-based act of state
doctrine. A court can avoid determining international disputes by finding no
jurisdiction because of no commercial activity or by finding a defense under
the act of state doctrine. By dismissal based on lack of jurisdiction, the court
is allowing foreign sovereigns considerably more deference than Congress
intended when it enacted the FSIA. The approach of equating jurisdictional
facts with the merits does not accord with the purposes of the act of state
doctrine as redefined by the Supreme Court to avoid separation of powers
problems. Failing to find jurisdiction truncates the analysis and distorts
concepts of restrictive immunity. The practical effect is to leave parties
without a remedy in the United States but without room to assert valid
defenses to an application of the act of state, even those possible defenses
based on factual disputes or those which place the situation within the
purview of the Hickenlooper Amendment. Finally, the collapsing of the
distinction between jurisdiction and merits allows no room for the argument
that the specific act of state in question is subject to an "unambiguous
agreement" or within a treaty,
such as in the case of currency controls, the
22
IMF Articles of Agreement.
II. Allied and Libra: Two Sides of the Coin

A.

ALLIED BANK INTERNATIONAL

v.

BANCO CREDITO AGRICOLA DE CARTAGO

1. Facts
Although both Allied and Libra involve the Costa Rican currency controls imposed in 1981 limiting payment of external debt, Allied arises from
reorganization proceedings in 1976 of the Latin American Bank, a bank
chartered by the Cayman Islands. Three Costa Rican banks, wholly-owned
by the Republic of Costa Rica, agreed to assume the debts of the Latin
American Bank to the members of the syndicate headed by Allied Bank,
involving close to $10 million dollars owed by certain Costa Rican creditors
to the Latin American Bank. While there was extensive negotiation between creditors, the transaction resulted in the disbursement of no new
funds. Each of the Costa Rican banks executed promissory notes to Allied
as agent for the syndicate and entered a side letter agreement with Allied.
Under each note, payments were to be made in U.S. dollars to Allied in New
York City, in eleven equal installments of principal, every six months,
22. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, as amended, effective April
1, 1978, 29 U.S.T. 2203, T.I.A.S. No. 8937 [hereinafter cited as Fund Agreement or Bretton
Woods Agreement].
VOL. 19, NO. 1
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beginning July 1, 1978 and ending July 2, 1983. The promissory notes and
the side letter agreements between each bank and Allied are bilingual, in
English and Spanish, but neither contains a specific choice of governing law,
nor the provision for an exclusive forum. The side letter agreement, under
"Events of Default," provides a 10-day grace period for late payment due to
inability to obtain U.S. dollars from the Central Bank of Costa Rica.
Although the parties considered the contingency of currency controls imposed by the Central Bank, no provision was made for long-term difficulties
or suspension of payments, nor for what law would govern any action based
on the imposition of currency restrictions.
Payments on the notes were made on schedule until 1983, at which time
Costa Rica "found it increasingly difficult to service their external debtthat is, debt to foreign creditors incurred in foreign currency. This inability
came about because of Costa Rica's dependence on imported oil, and a
decrease in prices of Costa Rican exports, among other factors." 23 To deal
with the economic crisis, Costa Rica imposed restrictions on foreign exchange transactions. Pursuant to the regulations, Banco Credito Agricola
de Cartago (Banco Cartago) applied to the Central Bank for sufficient
dollars to pay the July 1, 1981 installment of principal and interest from the
loan to Allied. It received a response on November 9, 1981 from Central
Bank, denying its application for the funds. In between the date of Banco
Cartago's application and the subsequent denial, two governmental transactions occurred. First, on August 27, 1981 the Central Bank adopted a
resolution limiting foreign exchange authorization for repayment of external debt to contracts with multilateral international agencies. Then on
November 6, 1981 the President of Costa Rica and the Minister of Finance
issued a decree forbidding the government, together with all public sector
entities, including the three banks involved in this transaction, from paying
principal or interest on external debt in foreign currency without prior
approval of the Central Bank in consultation with the Minister of Finance,
specifically stating that Costa Rica was renegotiating external debt and "for
this purpose there should be harmony of decisions and centralization in the
decision making process concerning the carrying out of the service of the
external debt, direct or contingent.", 24 Allied subsequently filed suit on
behalf of the 39 members of the syndicate and moved for summary judgment. The Costa Rican banks filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction, invalidity of process, and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In
response to Allied's motion for summary judgment, they asserted that the
23. Affidavit of Francisco Marin Alvarado, General Manager of Banco Credito Agricola de
Cartago, in opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, included in Appendix to
the Briefs 188, Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 733 F.2d 23 (2d Cir.
1984) [hereinafter cited as Appendix].
24. Appendix at 204-06.
WINTER 1985
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act of state doctrine raised an issue, precluding summary judgment in
Allied's favor.
2. District Court Decision and Critique
The district judge divided the issues into two parts, those concerning
jurisdiction and those concerning the act of state doctrine defense. First, the
court rejected without elaborate discussion an argument based on immunity
under the FSIA. The court then turned to the act of state doctrine.
A different question arises by virtue of the fact that the payment of the notes was
prevented by certain directives of the Central Bank of Costa Rica, and of the
President and Ministry of Finance of that country. This question is whether the
governmental
acts preventing payment of the notes fall within the act of state
25
doctrine.

The court listed three factors cited in Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v.
FederalRepublic of Nigeria,26a recent Second Circuit case, and determined
that one factor was crucial, that the act in question was public and designed
to serve a governmental function. Finally, the court voiced its concerns with
embarrassing the executive branch in its relations with Costa Rica. The
court denied Allied's motion for summary judgment. The parties subsequently stipulated that no factual issue existed as to the application of the act
of state doctrine and the case was dismissed. An appeal was filed with the
Second Circuit. All but one of the 39 banks involved in the Allied syndicate
voluntarily withdrew from the appeal and joined in private restructuring of
the debt, leaving only Fidelity Union Bank of New Jersey, the bank with the
largest exposure (over 18 percent) under the loans, as the sole remaining
bank to prosecute the appeal.
The district court's opinion in Allied suffers from a superficial analysis of
the application of the act of state doctrine within a context of currency
controls and in relation to the Foreign Sovereign Immunites Act. Although
the court correctly distinguishes between commercial activity for purposes
of jurisdiction under the FSIA and the defense of the act of state, there is no
attempt to coordinate these two doctrines. While acknowledging that the
acts necessary for jurisdiction and those preventing payment are not the
same, thus focusing on the currency controls as an act of state as opposed to
a breach of contract, the court fails to examine the nature of the alleged acts
of state and whether the precedent it relies on is applicable in this case.
There is no discussion of where the specific act in question occurred-the
territorial aspect of Sabbatino-nor whether the currency controls are
merely a breach of contract or whether they constitute a repudiation or
expropriation. The decision, by deleting any territorial reference, dangerously expands the act of state concept into areas involving international law.
25. Allied, 566 F. Supp. at 1443.
26. 647 F.2d 300, 316 n.38 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982).
VOL. 19, NO. 1
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The district court does not consider whether the conduct of Costa Rica
requires judgment under "ambiguous principles of international law," one
factor raised in Sabbatino and referred to by the circuit court in Texas
Trading. It appears that neither the district judge nor the parties considered
whether principles of international law should be examined. Nor did the
court discuss the practical effect of its decision of giving extraterritorial
application to currency controls and whether such action was subject to, or
consistent with, the IMF Articles of Agreement.
3. Second Circuit Opinion

The Second Circuit, in a brief per curiam opinion, 27 affirmed the district
court's dismissal, managing in the process to further complicate adjudication of sovereign acts by erecting another stumbling block, in addition to the
already existing ones of jurisdiction under the FSIA and the act of state
doctrine. The court specifically disclaimed any reliance on the act of state
doctrine, choosing instead to base its decision on "comity," since the "actions of the Costa Rican government that caused the28 default are consistent
with the policy and the law of the United States."
The major weakness in the opinion is the court's interpretation of the
"policy and law" of the United States and its reliance primarily on a one
hundred year old case, Canada Southern Railway Co. v. Gebhard,29 and
several act of state cases. Even the federal government has indicated that the
Second Circuit's position "is based on an inaccurate understanding of the
policy of the U.S." ' 30 In its recitation of the facts, the court places emphasis
on the subsequent rescheduling of payments following the district court's
dismissal ("[a]ppellees have made payments to the other thirty-eight banks
as required in the refinancing agreement"), 3' foreshadowing its concept of
the "policy and law" of the United States and emphasizing the totally
unrelated presidential certification to Congress 32 that continued foreign aid
to Costa Rica is "in the national interest." 33 In addition to citing the
27. Allied Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 733 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1984), reh'g
granted, July 3, 1984.

28. Id. at 24.
29. 109 U.S. 527 (1883).
30. Wall St. J.Europe, June 13, 1984, at 9, col. 3.
31. Allied, 733 F.2d at 25.
32. Such a certification is mandated by the Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C.A. § 2370(q)
(West 1979), if a sovereign who defaults on foreign aid is to receive further assistance.
33. The Foreign Assistance Act provides:
No assistance shall be furnished under this chapter to any country which is in default, during a
period in excess of six calendar months, in payment to the United States of principal or
interest on any loan made to such country under this chapter, unless such country meets its
obligations under the loan or unless the President determines that assistance to such country
is in the national interest and notifies the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
Committee of Foreign Relations of the Senate of such determination.
22 U.S.C.A. § 2370(q) (West 1979).
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required letters from the executive to Congress as evidence of the United

States policy of support for Costa Rica's reaction to its economic crisis, the
Second Circuit also mentions that the federal government participated in a

Paris Club rescheduling by signing an Agreed Minute recommending the
rescheduling of Costa Rica's commercial obligations, which is a rather
standard provision within Paris Club reschedulings. 34 Through the use of

subsequent federal government actions, required by statute and concerning
only sovereign defaults on public debt, the court manages to transfer federal
government action within the spectrum of public debt to private debt.

Although rejecting the act of state doctrine as a basis for decision in this
case, the Second Circuit indicates its support for the territorial limitation of
the doctrine and the attached situs requirements.35 In contrast to the district
court's rejection of the sovereign action as one of confiscation, the Second
Circuit relies on United Bank, Ltd., v. Cosmic InternationalInc.3 6 and
Republic of Iraq v. First National City Bank,37 both confiscation cases. The

court decides that it is unnecessary to determine the situs of the debt owed
by the Costa Rican banks since even if the situs were in the United States,
the "actions of the Costa Rican government will still be recognized as valid
in United States courts if they are consistent with the law and policy of the
United States." 38 For the Second Circuit, the law and policy of the United
States is encompassed within two areas, that of bankruptcy and that of
foreign aid. In a rather disjointed conclusion, the Second Circuit finds that

the government of Costa Rica was acting as a sovereign, rather than being
engaged in commercial activity, a distinction which would appear unnecessary in any decision based on comity, as opposed to the act of state or

jurisdiction under the FSIA. Interestingly, the court specifically refers to
two act of state cases for support of the sovereign nature of Costa Rica's
actions, Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp.39 and InternationalAssociation of Machinist and Aerospace Workers v. OPEC.40
34. The Paris Club is the name used to refer to a group of 10 creditor governments plus
Switzerland which convenes for ad hoc reschedulings of sovereign debt owed to official
creditors. It has been involved in more than 60 reschedulings. The Paris Club generally requires
the debtor state to adopt IMF austerity measures and to attempt rescheduling of debt owed
private creditors as a condition of the official government rescheduling. For a discussion of the
Paris Club's activities, see generally IMF, External Debt in Perspective,Sept. 1983, 27; Cizauskas, InternationalDebt Renegotiatons: Lessons from the Past,7 WORLD DEV. 199, 207 (1979);
Hardy, Rescheduling Developing Country Debts: 1956-1980: Lessons and Recommendations,
Working Paper No. 1, Overseas Development Council (1982); A Nightmare of Debt: A Survey
ofInternational Banking, THE ECONOMIST, March 20, 1982.
35. "The act of state doctrine precludes the examination of a foreign sovereign's confiscation
of property within its own territory. ...Thus, if the situs of the obligations is Costa Rica, the
district court properly dismissed the action." Allied, 733 F.2d at 26 (citations omitted).
36. 542 F.2d 868 (2d Cir. 1976).
37. 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965).
38. Allied, 733 F.2d at 26.
39. 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977).
40. 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982).
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a. Comity
While the concept of comity is not new, the use of this doctrine as an
alternative to the act of state doctrine appears to be a novel position. A
classic definition of comity appears in Hilton v. Guyot,4 1 in which the
Supreme Court stated:
No law has any effect, of its own force, beyond the limits of the sovereignty from
which its authority is derived. The extent to which the law of one nation, as put in
force within its territory, whether by executive order, by legislative act, or by
judicial decree, shall be allowed to operate within the dominion of another nation,
depends upon what our greatest jurists have been content to call "the comity of
nations." Although the phrase has been often criticized, no satisfactory substitute
has been suggested.
"Comity," in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation on the
one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will upon the other. But it is the
recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to internationalduty
and convenience, and to the rights
4 2 of its own citizens or of otherpersons who are
under the protection of its laws.

Although the consideration of the effect of comity on United States citizens
is mentioned in Hilton, and is recognized within two other decisions cited by

the Second Circuit, UnitedStates v. Belmont,43 and Banco Nacionalde Cuba
v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 44 the court appears to ignore the
actual effect of its decision on the private litigant, Allied, subrogating that
interest to what it perceives of as the "law and policy" of the United States.

On the opposite end of the scale, no mention is made of "international
duty," a concept here arguably embracing the international law standards of
nondiscrimination and the requirements under Article VIII of the IMF
Agreement.
This failure to balance interests becomes more evident if one looks at the
circumstances surrounding both Belmont and Chemical Bank. In Belmont,
the United States as plaintiff sued to recover funds deposited with Belmont,
a private banker, by a Russian corporation which was nationalized in 1918.
The claim of the Russian government had been assigned in 1933 to the
United States government under the Litvinov Agreement, a part of the
means by which diplomatic relations were established between the United
States and Soviet Union, which provided for the assignment of all claims
held by the Soviet Union against American nationals to the United States.
One of the primary issues involved in the case was whether the President had
sufficient authority to settle by executive agreement claims by U.S. citizens,
an issue which was given second life following the Iranian assets freeze and
the subsequent presidential suspension of all lawsuits involving Iran. The
41.
42.
43.
44.

159 U.S. 113 (1894).
Id. at 163-64 (emphasis added).
301 U.S. 324 (1937).
658 F.2d 903 (2d Cir. 1981).
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Supreme Court in Belmont upheld the President's actions, giving extraterritorial effect to the Russian confiscation decrees, and rejecting the
argument accepted by the court below that the situs of the bank deposits was
in New York and thus the public policy of New York against confiscation
required dismissal of the government's claim. The Supreme Court stated:
So far as the record shows, only the rights of the Russian corporationhave been
affected by what has been done; and it will be time enough to considerthe rights of
our nationals when, if ever, by proper judicial proceeding, it shall be made to
appear that they are so affected as to entitle them to judicial relief. The substantive

right to the moneys, as now disclosed, became vested in the Soviet Government as
the successor to the corporation; and this right that government has passed to the
United States. It does not appear that respondents have any interest in the matter
beyond that
of a custodian. Thus far no question under the Fifth Amendment is
45
involved.

In United States v. Pink,46 the Supreme Court, again considering the
Litvinov Agreement, allowed the government to obtain certain assets
against foreign creditors, but again stressed the fact that all of the claims of
United States citizens had been paid. In the subsequent Chemical Bank
decision, the Second Circuit characterized Belmont as furthering U.S. policy since the government sought to "amass a fund from which American
nationals having valid claims against the Soviet government could be compensated, and it sued to recover the deposit from the banker." 47 In refusing
to apply the act of state doctrine so as to bar the claim in Chemical Bank, the
Second Circuit highlighted the beneficial nature of its allowing the action
and the absence of harm to American citizens.
While United States law of course does not approve the taking of private property
without compensation, the former owners of the Private Banks have lodged no
protest, either by bringing suit to recover their United States property, or by
seeking to intervene in Banco Nacional's suits. In the twenty years during which
these suits have been pending, the former owners have not asserted any conflicting
claim. Thus we cannot say that the effect in this case of recognizing the Cuban
nationalization of the Private Banks would violate United States policy.
To the contrary, we conclude that allowing Banco Nacional to sue as successor
here will further the goals of the United States, because it will assist in providing
funds in the United States from which American nationals who have valid claims
against the government of Cuba may be compensated, at least in part, for their
claims ....

Rights of Parties. In contrast to both Belmont and Chemical Bank, the
Second Circuit in Allied fails to consider the practical effect of its decision on
the rights of the parties, here U.S. banks. The result of giving extraterrito45. Belmont, 301 U.S. at 332. (emphasis added)
46. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
47. Chemical Bank, 658 F.2d at 909.
48. Id. (emphasis added). See also Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen, 544 F.2d 624,629 (2d Cir. 1976)
(discussing comity under New York law).
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rial recognition to the Costa Rican decrees and of dismissing the action may
benefit foreign policy but does not aid the American litigants. Although
under the guise of comity, the end result of giving effect to the currency
controls and subsequent actions of the government of Costa Rica is equivalent to an analysis under the act of state doctrine. One could hold, as did the
district court, that the act involved while not a confiscation is nontheless an
act of state, thus removing any territorial restriction to the act of state
doctrine, or one could find that the situs of the debt was within Costa Rica.
Either determination would result in a decision equivalent to that of using
comity. The Second Circuit, although labelling its decision as based on
"comity," reaches a decision in much the same way as the district court in
Libra, only finding public policy to favor the Costa Rican action, as opposed
that the conduct is a confiscation in
to the Libra court's determination
49
violation of U.S. policy.
b. Bankruptcy and Rescheduling. The Second Circuit, shifting its focus
from the imposition of currency controls to rescheduling and refinancing of
sovereign debt, bolsters its position that such actions are in keeping with

American law and policy by analogizing the Costa Rican prohibition of
payment to a Chapter 11 reorganization under the Bankruptcy Code 5' and
citing the earlier Canada Southern case. A basic flaw in this comparison is
the failure to distinguish between an action in bankruptcy and a sovereign
rescheduling. Unlike a bankruptcy action which is statutorily controlled and
judicially supervised, rescheduling, especially of private debt, has no established procedures and provides no legal protection to the debtor. In the case
of the Paris Club, it is the debtor who determines whether rescheduling is
initiated for public debt, leaving the creditor nations unable to force rescheduling, thus removing the power and protection given the creditor

under federal bankruptcy law of putting the debtor into bankruptcy. Private
rescheduling, as opposed to Paris Club rescheduling of public debt, offers
even less structure and is conducted on a purely ad hoc basis. Although a
reorganization under Chapter 11 stays pending litigation, 5 1 the initiation of
rescheduling of sovereign debt by Costa Rica, as utilized by the Second
Circuit, does not merely suspend Allied's claim, but instead results in
dismissal of the claim, removing all legal remedies and leaving Allied only
the alternative of an informal, nonjudicially controlled compromise in the
form of rescheduling. The equating of sovereign rescheduling with U.S.

bankruptcy proceedings makes sense only if the effect of comity were to
create an abstention-type doctrine which would stay judicial action pending
rescheduling but not result in immediate dismissal. It is also questionable

49. Compare Libra, 570 F. Supp. at 882.
50. It U.S.C.A. §§ 1101-74 (West 1979 & Supp. 1984).
51. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362 (West 1979 & Supp. 1984).
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whether the court's linking of private rescheduling to that of the Paris Club
violates the rights of private banks, especially smaller banks pressured to
accept rescheduling, denying them due process and resulting in the taking of
private property, at least where such action is not coincident with a national
emergency, such as that involved in the Iranian accord. Certainly in this
case, the President's certification under the Foreign Assistance Act hardly
rises to the level of action involved in Belmont or in the Iranian cases.
The Second Circuit relies heavily on Canada Southern, an 1883 case
concerning Canadian railway bonds which were affected by a scheme of
reorganization approved by the Canadian government. Although the case
also involved a bankruptcy and reorganization, the Supreme Court decision
focuses on the corporate nature of the railway and the expectations of the
bondholders that the corporation in which they invested would be subject to
the rules of the country in which the corporation is domiciled. In many ways,
Canada Southern presents an appealing analogy to Costa Rica's rescheduling of its external debt, although the strong dissent by Justice Harlan is
equally applicable to Allied. Harlan takes the position that the giving of
extraterritorial effect to the scheme of reorganization is contrary to the
policy of the United States because the bondholders were not able to
approve the scheme. In addition, the action would not be allowed to an
American railway with contractual obligations to American citizens. In
effect, the Supreme Court presumes that the law of Canada would apply,
even though the bonds were payable in New York. Whether CanadaSouthern maintains its vitality outside the corporate context, given the strong
emphasis on the domicile factor, is questionable. It is also arguable that
international banks, unlike shareholders, are not accepting the risk that
"anything done at the legal home of the corporation, under the authority
of such laws, which discharges it from liability there, discharges it
everywhere." 52 Nor is the Supreme Court's conclusion that one "may
protect himself against all unjust legislation of the foreign government by
refusing to deal with its corporations," 53 a valid alternative for international
financial transactions in the current multinational business environment.
c. Foreign Assistance Act. Perhaps more troubling than the usage of
the Bankruptcy Act is the Second Circuit's reliance on the Foreign Assistance Act for support of its position that giving extraterritorial effect to the
actions of the Costa Rican government is in keeping with United States
policy and law. The use of the President's certification has major ramifications for the area of sovereign immunity, serving to politicize yet another
area where judicial decision-making should create a neutral resolution.
Sovereign liability, an area which Congress attempted to remove from
executive politics by enacting the FSIA, has been repoliticized by the district
52. 109 U.S. at 538.

53. Id. at 539.
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court's use of the act of state doctrine and here by the Second Circuit's use of
comity based on foreign aid programs. The result of this reconnection of
executive foreign policy and the judiciary is to remove the appearance of
neutrality, allowing the potential for substantial manipulation and the possibility of discrimination in treatment of foreign sovereigns in violation of
international law. Given the increasing number of reschedulings of debt by
developing countries, foreign aid should not be a determinative factor in
deciding whether a rescheduling, or currency controls imposed in connection with a rescheduling, should be given extraterritorial effect. Such decisions should not depend on the political aims of the executive or the
parochial aims of U.S. foreign policy, especially when the actions may
overlap into areas subject to the IMF Articles of Agreement. Nor should the
concept of comity vary with the politics of the country seeking rescheduling,
whether it is one deemed vital to American interests, or whether it is one
whose political philosophy is not necessarily in accord with American goals.
Besides creating the potential for discrimination and inconsistency, the use
of foreign aid decisions as the basis for judicial decisions serves to further
fragment the extraterritorial treatment of currency controls under the IMF
Agreement and to raise questions when the loans are not based in the
United States or do not apply U.S. law. This position is obviously not a
solution available to countries who do not engage in substantial foreign aid
programs. In the area of international financial transactions which requires
supranational concepts, the Allied opinion's reliance merely on foreign aid
as a basis for giving extraterritorial effect to sovereign actions rather than
encouraging private contract or uniform principles, polarizes decisionmaking.
d. Legal Effect of Recognizing Foreign Acts. One final difficulty with
the Allied opinion is its failure to discuss the legal effect of recognizing the
Costa Rican government's acts. Even though the court accords these actions
extraterritorial effect, there is no mention of whether under the appropriate
law such actions should constitute a valid defense to the contract, such as
force majeure. Like the district court, the appellate court never completes
the analysis between giving extraterritorial effect to the rescheduling and
dismissing the action. The step missing is the determination of the proper
choice of law, given that the parties failed to provide a governing law in the
agreement, and whether under that choice of law the defense based on
extraterritorial recognition is a valid one. Assuming the proper law is not
that of Costa Rica, there is also the issue of whether federal or state law
applies and whether public policy has a role, such as in the New York Court
of Appeals case, J. Zeevi & Sons, Ltd. v. Grindlays Bank (Uganda) Ltd.5 4
54. 37 N.Y.2d 220, 333 N.E.2d 168 371 N.Y.S.2d 892 (1975). In this case, the New York
Court of Appeals refused to apply currency controls imposed by Uganda against Israeli citizens
and businesses. To reach this result, the court first determined the proper choice of law, which it
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Unlike Belmont, there is no executive accord requiring that federal law
control. Nor is the basis for decision that of the act of state doctrine which
the Supreme Court has held to be an issue of federal law. 55 By placing the
decision on the grounds of comity, it would appear that the court would be
free to consider validity of the defense in connection with the law of New
York or the law of the United States. Here the court, using comity, analyzes
whether the rescheduling action accords with United States policy. The
court arrives at the opposite conclusion from that of the district court in
Libra which also used United States policy, within the rubric of public
policy. The determinative factor is clearly the characterization of the underlying action (default) as "reorganization" as in the Second Circuit's Allied
decision, or "confiscation" as in the district court's Libra opinion.
e. Summary
The Second Circuit's opinion in Allied has in many respects raised more
questions than it has answered, creating an additional hurdle for litigants
attempting to enforce rights involving foreign sovereigns and increasing the
potential for inconsistent and discriminatory treatment by reestablishing the
connection between sovereign litigation and foreign policy. Comity is too
flimsy a concept to control an area requiring consistency. Comity implies an
inherent balancing of the interests of the citizens of the State according
effect to the actions of the foreign sovereign and the interest of the foreign
sovereign, as well as international law. This element is sadly lacking in the
Second Circuit's analysis.
B.

LIBRA BANK LIMITED

v.

BANCO NACTIONAL DE COSTA RICA,

S.A.

1. Facts
Although Libra raises questions similar to those in Allied concerning the
application of the act of state doctrine to currency controls, the district
judge, also a member of the Southern District of New York, reached the
opposite result at approximately the same date. In Libra, sixteen banks

made a $40 million dollar short-term trade-related loan to Banco Nacional
with repayment in four installments, beginning July 30, 1981, with the next

three successive installments to follow monthly. Under the terms of the loan
agreement, Banco Nacional consented to the jurisdiction of New York
courts and to the choice of New York law and specifically waived immunity.

deemed to be that of New York, and then determined that the currency control was against the
public policy of the forum, being confiscatory and discriminatory. The court rejected the
application of the act of state doctrine and also determined that Article VIII of the Fund
Agreement would not apply. Id. at 228, 333 N.E.2d at 173-74, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 900.
55. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 425.
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All payments were to be made in New York City. In accordance with the
Costa Rican currency requirements, Banco Nacional applied for the necessary foreign currency to the Central Bank which request, as in Allied, was
denied by Central Bank.
2. District Court Opinion and Critique

a. Act of State
The district court's opinion in Libra contains two sections of interest for
international financial law, that involving the application of the act of state
doctrine and that involving the Bretton Woods Agreement. In the first
portion of the decision, the district court defines the act of state doctrine in
terms of expropriation by focusing on the Sabbatino formulation and the
territorial limitations on this doctrine. Faced with a definition of the act of
state requiring an act outside of the territory of the foreign sovereign to
avoid application of the doctrine, the court labors to analyze the problem as
one of an expropriation of property, in this case the debt owed to Libra, and
to find that at the time of confiscation the debt was located in New York by
using the Second Circuit's formula from Menendez 56 that a debt for purposes of the act of state doctrine "is not 'located' within a foreign state unless
that state has the power to enforce or collect it." Once the court establishes
that the property was confiscated within the United States, the court may
ignore the act of state doctrine. The narrow definition of the act of state
doctrine, strictly in terms of Sabbatino and its progeny, so as to apply only to
extraterritorial takings, contrasts with the broad definition and focus of the
Allied district court which encompasses more than "takings." The district
judge in Libra rejects the argument accepted in Allied that the sovereign
acts in question were the currency control regulations and that these acts
occurred in Costa Rica. The court, finding that the debt "at the time of the
attempted confiscation" was in the United States, provides a list of certain
determinative factors for situs, including: consent to New York jurisdiction
and laws; payment in New York City; and location of Banco Nacional assets
in New York City bank accounts and in the United States. These criteria
relied upon by the district judge are those that would generally be used to
analyze sufficiency of contacts for jurisdiction or for choice of law. Here the
choice of law has been made by the parties. In effect, the court has merged
jurisdiction with situs, although first separating the two to avoid the situs
definition in Menendez. The court neglects to consider the possibility that
situs may differ with its purpose for jurisdiction, for attachment, and for the
act of state doctrine. Once the court places the debt in New York and
removes the act of state issue, the court must determine whether giving
56. Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Alfred Dunhill of London v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
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effect to the Costa Rican decrees is consistent with public policy of the
forum. By slight of hand the court switches its focus on the confiscation to
the Costa Rican decrees and determines that "it shall not give effect to the
Costa Rican decrees since a foreign state's effective confiscation of property, without compensation, is repugnant to the Constitution and laws of
this nation." 57
The weak link in the Libra argument is the assumption from the beginning
that the enactment of currency controls and inability of the bank to make
payment constitute a confiscation or expropriation under a Sabbatino-type
analysis. Obviously, since the court relies heavily on Sabbatino to limit the
act of state doctrine to those actions within the territory of the sovereign, the
court must fit the underlying transaction, the default on the loan by the
Costa Rican bank for whatever reason, into the accepted concept of expropriation. The court rejects Banco Nacional's argument that the currency
controls do not confiscate property but "merely prevented defendant from
repayment" and instead summarizes the case as involving "the attempt by a
foreign nation to avoid payment of a debt which it concededly owes to its
creditors." 58 The court fails to consider whether Costa Rica has repudiated
its obligation or whether it has merely breached its contractual obligations.
In fact, there is nothing in the language of the Nov. 6, 1981 decree indicative
of what one traditionally considers an expropriation of property by a
sovereign. Rather, the decree is drafted as a regulation clearly tied to the
renegotiating of external debt. The court seems to have some difficulty with
the expropriation analysis, finding an expropriation for purposes of a territorially-limited Sabbatino and yet subsequently backing-off from this position to recognize an "attempted confiscation" for purposes of situs of the
debt and the analysis under Menendez.
As part of the characterization of the underlying action as one of confiscation, the court must find some property whose situs is not in the territory of
the foreign sovereign and which when taken constitutes an act of seizure.
Thus, the court, in contrast to the Allied district court, focuses not on the
57. Libra, 570 F. Supp. at 882. The Libra opinion was cited as support for the nonapplicability of the act of state in a case involving the default by a Honduras corporation and individual on
a loan agreement and guarantee. The defendants argued impossibility of performance, but the
court found that the Honduran government did not prohibit payments but only required
authorization for payment be obtained from Central Bank. Apparently the defendants had
obtained the necessary consent earlier but failed to renew it. Judge Motley, the same judge who
rendered the Libra opinion, rejected the application of the act of state doctrine since the debt
was payable in New York and if Central Bank denied authorization, this would "be tantamount
to a foreign sovereign's confiscation of property without compensation" and would be "repugnant to the laws and policies of the United States and should not be given effect." Baer
American Banking Corp. v. Hector Kattan, No. 82 Civ. 5834 (S.D.N.Y. January 6, 1984).
Whether the reliance on Libra is still valid in light of the Second Circuit's opinion in Allied is
questionable.
58. Id. at 880 (emphasis in original).
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currency control but on the right to repayment of a debt. In effect, the court
finds that the confiscated property is the contractual right to repayment.
This position, however, does not accord with that of New York law as
illustrated in French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba.59 In French, the Court of
Appeals of New York stated that a currency regulation, in this case one
forbidding the conversion of pesos into dollars, was not an expropriation.
"A currency regulation which alters either the value or character of the
money to be paid in satisfaction of contracts is not a 'confiscation' or
'taking.' 60 Although the act of state doctrine is an issue of federal law, how
one categorizes the underlying transaction may vary. Since the parties chose
New York law to govern, it is questionable whether the district court erred
in taking a position contrary to that of the Frenchcase. In light of French, the
Libra court's finding of an expropriation, without any discussion, leaves the
decision subject to attack. The categorization of the currency controls and
defaults on the loan as resulting in confiscation in itself allows the court to
reach the desired result, finding the act of state doctrine inapplicable as
contrary to the public policy of the United States.
b. The Bretton Woods Argument
Having lost the act of state doctrine argument, Banco Nacional subsequently moved for reargument, contending that the non-enforcement of the
loan agreement is consistent with United States laws and policies in the form
of the Bretton Woods Agreement, contrary to the district court's determination that no effect should be given to the currency controls because they are
not consistent with the policy of the United States. Banco Nacional asserted
that the loan agreement is unenforceable under Article VIII, Sec. 2(b) of the
IMF Articles of Agreement which provides that "[e]xchange contracts
which involve the currency of any member which are contrary to the exchange control regulations of that member maintained or imposed consistently with this Agreement shall be unenforceable in the territories of any
member." The district judge rejected this argument for three reasons:
(1) the loan agreement was not an exchange contract under the Bretton
Woods Agreement; (2) intervening changes in foreign currency regulations
rendering a contract unenforceable are not within the scope of the particular
section of the Articles of Agreement; and (3) Banco Nacional failed to
demonstrate that the currency regulations were consistent with the Bretton
Woods Agreement.
The court first considered the issue of whether the loan agreement was an
"exchange contract" within Article VIII. Reviewing New York state law on
59. 23 N.Y.2d 46, 242 N.E.2d 704 295 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1968).
60. Id. at 55, 242 N.E.2d at 710, 295 N.Y.S.2d at 442. See F. Mann, THE LEGAL ASPECT OF
MONEY 474 (4th ed. 1982).
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what constitues an exchange contract, the court discusses two New York
cases, Banco do Brasilv. A. C. Israel Commodity Co. 61 and J. Zeevi & Sons,
Ltd., v. Grindlays Bank (Uganda) Ltd.62 and refers only for comparison to a
third, Weston Banking Corp. v. Turkiye Garanti Bankasi.63 In Weston, the

defendant argued that Turkish law forbade the payment of a promissory
note designating payment in Swiss Francs. Since the United States and
Turkey are signatories to the Bretton Woods Agreement, under Article
VIII Sec. 2(b), the promissory note between the Panamenian Banking
Corporation and a Turkish bank would not be enforceable. The New York
Court of Appeals although rejecting the act of state defense and the Bretton
Woods argument, clearly accepted the position that the promissory note
was
64
subject to the Bretton Woods Agi'eement in certain circumstances.
One particularly telling feature of the Libra court's analysis of the Bretton
Woods Agreement is its failure to consider whether its position on exchange
contracts, and for that matter, that of earlier New York state cases, is in
accord with that of other members of the International Monetary Fund.
Obviously there is disagreement, not only among commentators, but even
among the New York state courts. While the judgment would be enforceable within the United States because of the Full Faith and Credit Clause,
this is not necessarily the case for enforcing the judgment outside the U.S.
When the court's interpretation of exchange contract is in conflict with the
forum where enforcement is sought, the judgment may become unenforceable under the Bretton Woods Agreement. For example, in a country where
the term "exchange contract" is given a broader meaning, a court might not
enforce a judgment or an attachment which involved a judgment obtained in
spite of, and in conflict with, Article VIII. Given that Banco Nacional has
removed all funds from the state of New York, it is possible that Libra would
seek enforcement against assets held outside of the United States and within
the countries of other members of the IMF.
Libra illustrates the difficulty in characterizing currency controls and the
need for coordination with the Bretton Woods Agreement. In Libra, the
district court specifically found that the currency controls of Costa Rica
would not receive extraterritorial effect because they were contrary to the
61. 12 N.Y.2d 371, 239 N.Y.S.2d 872, 190 N.E.2d 235 (1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 906
(1964).
62. 37 N.Y.2d 220, 371 N.Y.S.2d 892, 333 N.E.2d 168, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 866 (1975).
63. 57 N.Y.2d 31, 442 N.E.2d 1195, 456 N.Y.S.2d 684 (1982).
64. In this case, however, the regulation merely permits a Turkish bank to restructure the
debt. As we previously stated, there is no proof, in this record, that if the debt were not
restructured, the bank would be barred from repaying the plaintiff in Swiss Francs as required
by the terms of the note. Therefore, although we recognize the validity of the Bretton Woods
Agreement and its potential controlling effect over international currency transactions, on the
record before us, we do not find it to be applicable.
Id. at 326, 442 N.E.2d at 1200, 456 N.Y.S.2d at 689.
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public policy of the forum, by allowing for a confiscation. Although the
court says this policy is that of the United States, the public policy argument
allowing the disregard of the currency controls would not be available were
the court to find that the loan agreement was subject to the Bretton Woods
Agreement and that the controls were maintained consistently with the
Fund Agreement since the IMF's own interpretation of Article VIII, Sec.
2(b) states that public policy is not available as a means of avoiding application of Sec. 2(b). 65
III. Commentary

A.

CURRENCY REGULATIONS AND EXTRATERRITORIAL EFFECT

Lurking beneath the surface in Allied, Libra and Frankelare the nagging
questions of how to characterize currency regulations and whether such
restrictions amount to expropriation. This determination affects whether
65. The Board's interpretation states:
Unenforceability of Exchange Contracts: Fund's Interpretation of Article VIII, Section 2(b)
Exchange contracts which involve the currency of any member and which are contrary to
the exchange control regulations of that member maintained or imposed consistently with
this Agreement shall be unenforceable in the territories of any member.
The meaning and effect of this provision are as follows:
1. Parties entering into exchange contricts involving the currency of any member of the
Fund and contrary to exchange control regulations of that member which are maintained or
imposed consistently with the Fund Agreement will not receive the assistance of the judicial
or administrative authorities of other members in obtaining the performance of such contracts. That is to say, the obligations of such contracts will not be implemented by the judicial
or administrative authorities of member countries, for example by decreeing performance of
the contracts or by awarding damages for their non-performance.
2. By accepting the Fund Agreement members have undertaken to make the principle
mentioned above effectively part of their national law. This applied to all members, whether
or not they have availed themselves of the transitional arrangements of Article XIV,
Section 2.
An obvious result of the foregoing undertaking is that if a party to an exchange contract of
the kind referred to in Article VIII, Section 2(b) seeks to enforce such a contract, the tribunal
of the member country before which the proceedings are brought will not, on the ground that
they are contrary to the public policy (ordre public) of the forum, refuse recognition of the
exchange control regulations of the other member which are maintained or imposed consistently with the Fund Agreement. It also follows that such contracts will be treated as
unenforceable notwithstanding that under the private international law of the forum, the law
under which the foreign exchange control regulations are maintained or imposed is not the
law which governs the exchange contract or its performance.
The Fund will be pleased to lend its assistance in connection with any problem which may
arise in relation to the foregoing interpretation or any other aspect of Article VIII, Section
2(b). In addition, the Fund is prepared to advise whether particular exchange control
regulations are maintained or imposed consistently with the Fund Agreement.
Decision No. 446-4
June 10, 1949
International Monetary Fund, Decision No. 446-4 (1949), reprintedin International Monetary
Fund, Selected Decisions of the Executive Directorsand Selected Documents 90-91 (4th Issue
1970).
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the act of state doctrine should apply. Intertwined with whether currency
controls are within the purview of the act of state doctrine is the issue of
whether currency regulations should be given extraterritorial effect, a contested issue even after the establishment of the International Monetary
Fund. The general consensus of international law has been that currency
controls are not given extraterritorial effect. The refusal to recognize currency controls externally is based on one of three positions: (1) the controls
are penal; (2) the controls are revenue laws; or (3) the controls are contrary to the public policy of the forum. Although the establishment of the
IMF has modified this position, the scope of the IMF's influence, especially
in relation to private contracts, has been limited by some courts. And even
though the Fund Agreement provides for unenforceability of exchange
control regulations contrary to a member's regulations under Article VIII,
there has been substantial litigation, as well as substantial scholarly writings,
on the scope of this provision,
especially in connection with its effect on
66
private international law.
The most important factor in determining the reach of Article VIII, Sec.
2(b) is how one defines "exchange contract." There are two general
approaches to this definition, the broad approach, which defines the term as
including all contracts which "in any way affect a country's exchange resources" and the narrow construction which limits the term to contracts
which have "as their immediate object the exchange of international media
of payment, usually the exchange of one currency for another." 67 The
narrow interpretation is closer to that which has been adopted by courts in
the United States, particularly by the courts of New York state. The broader
definition has been favored by scholars and by some recent European court
decisions. International loan transactions such as that involved in both
Allied and Libra would be included under the broader definition.
Disagreement exists over the more basic question of what effect Article
VIII has on individual law and public policy, and whether it serves as a
conflict of laws rule or substantive law. This issue determines whether a
party may avoid the application of Article VIII by choosing the law which
does not contain the currency restriction, a possibility when the proper law is
not the restricting law and when one views the application of Article VIII as

66. See generally J. GOLD, THE FUND AGREEMENT IN THE COURTS (1962); J. Gold, THE FUND
AGREEMENT IN THE COURTS: VOLUME 11 (1982); J. Gold, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
AND PRIVATE BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS (1965); F. Mann, THE LEGAL ASPECT OF MONEY (4th ed.

1982); Baker, Enforcement of Contracts Violating Foreign Exchange Control Laws, 3 Int'l
Trade L.J. 247 (1977); Williams, ExtraterritorialEnforcement of Exchange ControlRegulations
under the InternationalMonetary Fund Agreement, 15 Va. J. Int'l L. 319 (1975).
67. The broad construction is advocated by Williams. See Williams, supra note 65, at 332-45.
The narrow construction is that followed by Nussbaum. See A. NUSSBAUM, MONEY IN THE LAW
542-45 (2d ed. 1950).
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a conflicts principle. Closely connected to this question is that of the relationship of Article VIII to the act of state doctrine. One argument is that
Article VIII has eliminated and displaced both public policy and the act of
state doctrine. 68 Under Sabbatino, the act of state doctrine does not apply
when a treaty or other unambiguous agreement is applicable. Since the
Fund Agreement is a treaty, it controls the enforcement of foreign exchange
control regulations of Fund members in U.S. courts and thus supersedes the
act of state doctrine.
The major difficulty with using an analysis which relies on public policy
rather than Article VIII is the possibility of reaching a result not in accordance with internationally accepted principles and one which might be
discriminatory in its treatment of different countries, as well as the possibility of a determination contrary to the Fund Agreement. The lack of consistency in applying Article VIII and defining its scope, especially the
meaning of exchange contract, exists not only in the United States but in
other countries and highlights the need for an international norm accepted
by all members of the IMF. This would insure that judgments obtained in
one jurisdiction would be enforceable in another, without the possibility of a
court where enforcement is subsequently sought finding that the Fund
Agreement dictates a contrary result. Unless there is one definition and an
agreement on the scope of Article VIII, courts in some jurisdictions, such as
New York state, will continue to gut the reach of the IMF Agreement and
encourage the parochiality which the IMF has tried to avoid in its overall
goal of an international monetary system.
B.

NEW YORK LAW

Given the prominence of New York as a center for commercial activities
and given the state nature of attachment proceedings, it is not surprising that
the majority of earlier cases considering the act of state doctrine in connec-

tion with currency controls arise within the New York state courts. While
the act of state doctrine is a matter of federal law, how one characterizes the

underlying actions so as to determine whether the act of state doctrine is
relevant appears to vary between state and federal courts. In addition to
dissimilar treatment of underlying acts, state law in certain areas offers

alternatives not available under federal law to the application of the act of
state doctrine. In light of the enactment of the FSIA, dismissal based on
forum non conveniens would appear to be unavailable in a federal forum, a
doctrine still available in state court, as seen in a recent New York Supreme
Court decision, Offshore Express, Inc. v. Multibanco Comermex, S.A. 69
68. Williams, supra note 66, at 387-94.

69. N.Y.Sup. Ct., Special Term, Part 1, New York City (reported in NEW YORK LAW
JOURNAL, July 7, 1983, p. 6, col. 1; discussed in INT'L FIN.L.REV., Sept. 1983, at 40).
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Judging from three New York Court of Appeals cases involving currency
regulations, that court appears less reluctant than federal courts to reach the
merits of a claim when currency restrictions are involved. In J. Zeevi & Sons,
Ltd., the court of appeals, through a liberal choice of New York law as the
governing law, used public policy to refuse to enforce discriminatory Ugandan currency controls and avoided applying the act of state doctrine by
finding the debt outside of Uganda. 70 In Weston, the court relied on the
territorial nature of the act of state doctrine, as well as the lack of an
adequate record demonstrating the applicability of the currency regulations
to the promissory note. 7 1 The court in Weston indicated a willingness to
consider the Bretton Woods Agreement as controlling if the regulations
were to ban payment in foreign currencies. Finally, the French case would
suggest that currency regulations do not constitute confiscations and that
while the act of state doctrine applied, the Bretton Woods Agreement might
provide a basis to remove the issue from the Sabbatino rule. In general, the
New York courts are more restrictive in applying the act of state doctrine,
focusing on the territorial aspect. When the choice of law of the parties, the
most significant contacts, or the proper law according to the court is that of
New York, the act of state doctrine does not seem to be applied, and the
public policy of the forum controls as in Zeevi, or an examination of the
actual effect of the regulation is made as in Weston. In contrast, when the
law chosen is that of the foreign sovereign, as in French, the act of state
doctrine controlled.
C.

EFFECTS OF APPLYING THE

ACT

OF STATE DOCTRINE

The application of the act of state doctrine, as illustrated by the Libra and
Allied cases, creates uncertainty in international transactions, an area traditionally requiring predictability of possible risk. Syndicated loans have
become increasingly complex in the last several years, with stronger reliance
being placed on the language of the contract to provide for all conceivable
contingencies, especially those of sovereign risk. In the light of Allied, the
parties are likely to attempt to resolve the problem of intervening currency
controls through private international law, resulting in increasing stress on
the contract document to foresee and resolve not only existing but subsequent problems. The danger of such approach is that the private contract
will not accord with accepted principles of international law. Even if the
contract were enforceable in one jurisdiction, enforcement outside of such
jurisdiction might not be possible. Another suggested alternative, contractual waiver by the parties of the act of state defense, appears ineffectual
70. See supra note 54.
71. See supra note 63-64.
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since such doctrine is judicially created. Although the parties perhaps could
agree that supervening currency regulations would have no effect on a
contract, a sovereign could abrogate all prior agreements so that the revocation or annulment would become the act of state, as opposed to the currency
controls.
The use of the act of state doctrine as a defense to international loan
transactions, acting as a "super choice of law," limits private contract,
superseding the choice made by the parties. By applying the act of state
doctrine to deny recovery, the expectations of the parties have been
changed and their contract modified without choice, or at least unilaterally.
The carefully drafted and negotiated waivers of immunity, such as that
involved in Libra, in reality provide no security against default. One may
obtain jurisdiction over a sovereign under the FSIA based on explicit
waivers, but if the act of state doctrine is available as a defense, jurisdiction
makes little difference. In effect, the waiver of immunity by a sovereign
becomes useless if not impossible, since the sovereign may engage in an act
which modifies the underlying transactions, which second act, if judged to
be an act of state, may be unquestionable in United States courts.
Application of the act of state doctrine within the context of international
loans also results in the extraterritorial extension of currency regulations in
contrast to normal expectations and the generally accepted rule. Currency
regulations which are confiscatory, penal, or discriminatory, such as those in
Zeevi,72 could nonetheless be enforced when the act of state doctrine is
allowed as a defense. Had the court in Zeevi utilized an Allied-type analysis,
the act of the Ugandan government would not be subject to review or
considered invalid, and thus Zeevi would be denied relief in the courts of the
United States, perhaps with the illusory option of seeking relief in the courts
of Uganda. To some extent, extraterritorial effect for currency regulations
which are not discriminatory is now expected as a result of the IMF Articles
of Agreement, although there is a great deal of uncertainty concerning the
scope of the Fund Agreement and its application to private contracts.
The practical effects of Libra and Allied are not yet clear. If international
transactions contain a 50 percent risk of being unenforceable in courts of the
United States based on the act of state doctrine defense, carried to a logical
conclusion, syndicated loans to third world countries from American banks
may decrease substantially. The character of the lenders may also change,
based on the increased risk of unenforceability. The 2ost of borrowing
money, the choice of law and the choice of forum may also be altered.
International bankers would be ill-advised to select New York law or New
York courts under international loans, given the current precedent created
by the Allied case. On the other hand, the decision in Libra is also damaging
72. See supra note 54.
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to continued lending to third world sovereigns, reflecting a rigid application
of public policy and an inherent appearance of partiality in United States
courts. In addition to influencing international loan transactions, the application of the act of state doctrine within this context serves to further
politicize the doctrine itself, in direct contradiction to the express Congressional desire under the FSIA to remove questions of sovereignty from the
political arena. Unless there is a commercial exception to the act of state
doctrine, as there is to the availability of sovereign immunity, the ability to
obtain jurisdiction over a sovereign based on commercial activity but subsequent inability to reach the merits results in no gain for international law. In
addition, the application of the act of state doctrine encourages parties to
place further reliance on private contract, thus hindering the development
of international law and norms. Finally, the application of the act of state
doctrine encourages a race to the courthouse to attach assets for the practical purpose of tying up sovereign assets and pressuring sovereigns into
favorable restructuring. Sovereign debtors, like the international bankers,
are also faced with a 50 percent chance of having the debt enforced, even
when contrary to currency controls consistent with the IMF Agreement.
D.

LIMITING THE ACT OF STATE

Several possible ways of restricting the scope of the act of state doctrine
have been suggested. The most obvious manner would be through coordinating the use and purposes of the act of state doctrine with the FSIA which
might include adopting a commercial activity exception to the act of state
doctrine. As part of this coordination, the scope of the act of state doctrine
should be more narrowly circumscribed for those cases where the act in
question is clearly within the territory of the sovereign. The territorial
limitation unifies the purposes of the FSIA with the sovereign immunity
origins of the act of state doctrine. The defense should be more broadly
defined in terms of the transaction giving rise to the claim, rather than a
subsequent action modifying the original obligations and thus available only
if that overall action should be above review.
In addition to the limitation through construction, legislative restriction
of the act of state doctrine was introduced in 1981. The International Rule of
Law Act 73 sought to prevent domestic courts from declining on the basis of
the act of state doctrine to make a determination on the merits in any case in
which the act of state is contrary to international law. The bill was not
73. S. 1434, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. 120-21 (daily ed. June 25, 1981). See
generally Mathias, Restructuringthe Act of State Doctrine:A Blueprintfor Legislative Reform,
12 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 369 (1980); Note, Limiting the Act of State Doctrine:A Legislative
Initiative, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 103 (1982).
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enacted by the 97th Congress, having been opposed at that time by the
international business community. Although the International Rule of Law
Act as proposed would have reached only those cases in which the act of
state was contrary to international law, courts were to determine which act
was relevant and whether it was contrary to international law. Thus, the
legislative proposal, while emphasizing the congressional desire to restrict
the use of the act of state doctrine in cases where a foreign sovereign has
engaged in violations of international law, left substantial flexibility to the
courts to construe the amendment narrowly with a result similar to current
law, or to abstain from reaching the merits based on the related political
question doctrine.
Another suggestion for limiting the act of state doctrine is by contractual
agreement, in much the way that sovereign immunity from both pre- and
post-judgment attachment are waived. The contractual waiver of act of
state, either explicitly or implicitly, however, creates certain problems, both
for litigation within the United States and for international enforcement of
judgments obtained in the United States. It is unclear whether parties could
waive the act of state doctrine, which is within the province of the judiciary;
but assuming that the parties were capable of such a waiver, the question
remains whether this contract could be enforced in another jurisdiction.
When the contractual waiver results in upholding the private contract and
when the enforcement of the contract is contrary to principles of international law, enforcement in other jurisdictions may not be possible. For
example, if the act of state waiver by contract is viewed as part of a choice of
law, it is conceivable that another forum may view the application of the
chosen law as inappropriate or contrary to the public policy of the forum. Or
had the loan agreement in Libra contained a waiver of the act of state
doctrine, under the law of certain jurisdictions the enforcement of the loan
might be considered contrary to the IMF Articles of Agreement under
Article VIII, Sec. 2(b), assuming that the loan transaction were considered
an exchange contract subject to the IMF Agreement. A judgment obtained
in the United States might be unenforceable in those jurisdictions in which
assets are located. The Fund Agreement itself also poses a problem of
enforcing private contractual waivers since the Fund's interpretation of
Article VIII states that contracts within this provision "will be treated as
unenforceable notwithstanding that under the private international law of
the forum the law under which the foreign exchange control regulations are
maintained or imposed is not the law which governs the exchange or its
performance." 74 Thus, when a loan agreement is considered by a jurisdiction to be within the scope of Article VIII, the provision of the Fund
Agreement clearly supersedes any private contractual agreement. A con74. See note 65 supra.
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tractual waiver of the act of state doctrine would still be unenforceable if it
required enforcement contrary to subsequent or intervening currency regulations or enactments by the sovereign debtor, which were consistent with
the Fund Agreement.
Since private contract alone fails to provide a solution to the uncertainty
created by the act of state doctrine, private contract could be used to provide
for reference to an international forum, allowing the determination under
international law of the validity and effect of the questioned act. In this way,
a court would not be passing on the validity of the acts of a sovereign but
would be left only with factual determinations. In the case of currency
controls, the obvious forum for determination of validity is that of the IMF,
given the acknowledged expertise of this organization and its already expanding role in private sector investment in connection with the current
rescue packages and rescheduling occurring in third world countries. In
addition to the IMF's experience with currency controls, the Fund Agreement is positive law in the U.S. in the form of a treaty. If Sabbatino is
inapplicable when a treaty is present and Article VIII is an example of such a
treaty provision, reliance by contract on the IMF Articles of Agreement to
determine the consistency of currency controls avoids direct resolution of
the validity of an act of a sovereign within its own territory by a U.S. court
and serves to insulate the IMF's decision from court review. The use of
private contract to provide for a determination by the IMF of the validity of
a currency regulation also avoids the inconsistent position of different
jurisdictions on whether international loan agreements are "exchange contracts" subject to Article VIII, Sec. 2(b). Through the use of private contract, in a subsequent determination of consistency by the IMF, even if a
court were not to view a particular loan transaction as within the Articles of
Agreement and therefore not under a treaty, the Sabbatino case would still
be inapplicable since the Fund's determination under the Fund Agreement
would be an "unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal principles." In addition, the restriction of Sabbatinowould be irrelevant since the
court would not be asked to review or judge the act of the sovereign but
rather to apply the IMF determination to the private contractual agreement
between the parties. The use of private contract and international law
principles as applied by a neutral forum such as the IMF would result in a
division of responsibility analogous to that existing between judge and jury,
with the IMF responsible for determining the validity and consistency of
currency regulations which would then be applied by the court to the specific
facts, such as whether the particular loan transaction was subject to the
currency regulations. A party could then obtain a judgment, either presently enforceable or unenforceable under the Fund Agreement, which
judgment would not be subject to attack if enforcement were sought in other
jurisdictions.
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EXTRA-JUDICIAL REMEDIES FOR CREDITORS

Although the application of the act of state doctrine to international loan
agreements could be limited through combining private contract with neutral international law principles through reference to the IMF or other
international forum, this limitation alone is not sufficient remedy for creditors of sovereign debtors. While it treats one aspect of the problem, that of
obtaining a judgment and avoiding dismissal without consideration of the
merits, creditors desperately need a mechanism utilizing both international
and private law to establish international rules for priority of creditors,
asset-taking, and the rights of non-joining creditors. Such a mechanism
would also be used to coordinate sovereign debt owed both the private and
public sectors, including debt owed to multinational organizations. With the
establishment of consistent principles for dealing with sovereign debt, international lending would not be discouraged and international financial transactions would not be subject to the whims of individual courts. Consistency
would provide some degree of predictability and certainty, and borrowers
could bargain and allocate risk more realistically. One of those risks might
indeed include supervening currency regulations which are consistent with
the IMF Agreement, resulting in a judgment which may be unenforceable at
the time or, if certain international rules for priority of creditors existed,
reorganization and rescheduling of debt. Creditors would not face the ad
hoc crisis rescheduling currently presents with Third World debt. The need
for an international forum to provide remedies for creditors of sovereign
debtors could be filled through the use of the IMF, not only to determine the
validity of currency controls but also to provide a procedure similar to
reorganization when currency controls which limit external debt payments
have been enacted. The model of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization
for dealing with rescheduling of sovereign debt of developing countries has
been suggested as a means to allow unified renegotiation and to include not
only official creditor institutions but also commercial banks. 75 Rescheduling, either through official creditor institutions such as the IMF or through
creditor clubs, in effect amounts to a situation analogous to a reorganization
where the creditor remains in possession and formulates a rehabilitation
plan. Rather than the ad hoc unofficial private rescheduling occurring with
the IMF, the Paris Club, or a combination of creditors, the proposal here is
75. See Note, ProceduralGuidelinesfor RenegotiatingLDC Debt: An Analogy to Chapter11
of the U.S. Bankruptcy Reform Act, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 305 (1981). See also Comment, On Third
World Debt, 25 HARV. INT'L L.J. 83 (1984) in which the authors suggest the creation of an
adjunct to the IMF to handle rescheduling and debt problems on an international basis, in
conjunction with increased IMF funding, additional cofinancing by private lenders and the
IADB to less developed countries, and the establishment of a clearinghouse for information on
borrowers.
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to formulate an official mechanism and procedure for rescheduling, establishing priority and coordinating debt owed to both official creditors and
private sector creditors, allowing for the setting of realistic goals for payments.
Any mechanism for private reorganization when currency regulations are
enacted would need to consider creditor rights, both prior to and after
involvement by the IMF or other international forum. In addition, the
procedure should encompass a form of stay provision similar to Chapter 11
so that the rescheduling would act as a stay for purposes of attachment of
assets and override private contract. Any private reorganization would need
to consider the rights of individual participants in a syndication and whether
there should be an equivalent of "cram down" so that non-joining creditors
in rescheduling would be forced to accept a reorganization plan. The rights
of smaller creditors should be considered, given that currently many are
forced through peer pressure to convert short-term loans to long-term debt.
To avoid the pressure on smaller banks unable to sustain large long-term
commitments, provision might be made for requiring that these banks be
bought out by larger lenders under certain circumstances. This would allow
majority rule as far as accepting rescheduling but add protection for minority participants in a manner similar to appraisal rights of dissenting shareholders.
While private contract and the IMF could be used for reorganizations, it
would appear that the courts also should be part of the process. Even if the
IMF determines the validity of currency regulations or acts in a role similar
to that of a trustee in bankruptcy, coordinating rescheduling, the court is still
necessary for fixing judgments and making determinations on factual issues.
A party could request that the IMF determine the validity of currency
controls and that the court determine the validity of a claim. A party could
obtain a judgment to establish and preserve a claim which judgment,
although valid, might not be enforceable at the time under the Fund Agreement. Article VIII, Sec. 2(b) renders a judgment unenforceable when the
currency regulations are validly and consistently imposed, until such time as
the currency regulations are removed or are no longer consistent with the
Fund Agreement. This approach not only avoids difficulty in enforcement in
other jurisdictions, but also minimizes the race to the courthouse on the part
of individual creditors to attach assets.
The creation of a procedure which includes the IMF offers distinct advantages. First, the act of state doctrine should not be a valid defense to a
consideration of the merits in any litigation either because international
rules provide sufficient "controlling legal principles" so as to make Sabbatino inapplicable or because the use of the IMF removes the act of a
sovereign for review and substitutes the IMF's determination of consistency. Nor is the public policy defense, as used in Libra, available, allowing
VOL. 19, NO. 1

INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS

257

different creditors to obtain priority based on whether a court chooses to
find the currency control against the public policy of the forum or not. By
incorporating the IMF into the process, and placing by definition or by
private contract the transaction within the reach of the Articles of Agreement, the defense based on public policy of the forum is no longer possible
under Article VIII, Sec. 2 (b). A procedure using the IMF still accords with
private contract, and in fact relies on contract to allocate risk and to consent
to the involvement of the IMF or other international organization, but
avoids the enforcement problems which may occur when the law of the
forum conflicts with international principles of law. A procedure utilizing
the IMF also offers the best source of information on the financial status and
obligations of a sovereign debtor, allowing a realistic assessment of what
payments are possible, what debts are outstanding, and how those debts
should be ranked. Finally, individual private creditors at least are assured
some predictability through a mechanism for establishing their claims and
providing for enforcement in some manner.
IV. Conclusion
The IMF offers the best hope for eventual enforcement, given the leverage it holds over subsequent loans and the sanctions available at least as to
debt owed to official creditors. The IMF should redefine "exchange contract" clearly to include international loan transactions. A broad definition
of exchange contract would be more consistent with the international nature
of financial transactions. A definition including international loans within
the scope of Article VIII, Sec. 2(b) would remove the possibility of applying
the act of state doctrine in contradiction to Article VIII when currency
controls are maintained consistently with the Fund Agreement, and should,
under the Fund Agreement, be given extraterritorial effect. The IMF should
also promulgate rules for renegotiation of sovereign debt under a procedure
similar to reorganization under Chapter 11 and encompassing all claims.
The rescheduling should act as a stay of pending litigation and attachment
proceedings. Finally, the IMF should promulgate rules establishing priority
of creditors, considering especially the effect that rescheduling has on such
priorities. As part of the rules governing priority of creditors, the IMF
should indicate what assets are attachable, what assets may serve as security,
and under what circumstances creditors may institute proceedings foreclosing on any security interest. What is necessary is a consistent international
standard for secured and unsecured transactions providing uniformity.
The expansion of the act of state doctrine into the area of currency
regulations poses problems in an era of increasing utilization of these
controls. Libra and Allied emphasize the need to clarify the act of state
doctrine and to limit its application. Neither case offers comfort or direction
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to the international banking community, with Libra reaching the desired
result of a judgment for the creditor, but with substantial areas of logic open
to criticism, and with Allied resulting in dismissal and the loss of the claim.
Because of the lack of consensus on the proper use and scope of the act of
state doctrine, lower courts have increasingly applied this doctrine in a
multitude of areas, both offensively and defensively, as a panacea for any
difficult question which involves a foreign policy issue or an international
law problem. The results, aside from lack of uniformity, include the failure
to formulate coherent international law principles and the abstention by the
judiciary in circumstances requiring court action, with the subsequent repoliticizing of the issue of sovereign immunity. The haphazard development
of the doctrine has led to anomalous results, as evidenced in the Libra/Allied
cases. The act of state doctrine has outgrown its use as a mechanism for
avoiding decision of questions involving international relations, given the
global aspect of business transactions today, the increased dependence on
international financial arrangements, and the growing presence of
sovereigns in commercial transactions. Within the context of currency controls, the doctrine has been pushed to its limits. Rights bargained for and
risks allocated are ignored. The international bank that negotiates with a
sovereign is playing without a full deck of cards; the court holds the trump
act of state and comity cards, but the bank has no hint as to when these cards
may be used.
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